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The Missouri Use Tax: Matching the
Burdens to the Benefits of Ownership
Fall Creek Construction Co. v. Director of Revenue'
I. INTRODUCTION
A use tax is the counterpart to a sales tax, imposed on purchases of tan-
gible personal property made outside the state if the property purchased is
then used within the state. Many people are not aware of the use tax, but Mis-
2
souri has had a use tax since 1959. A state's use tax can generate significant
revenue for the state. Therefore, when the State of Missouri experiences large
budget deficits, the Department of Revenue has a huge incentive to keep a
closer eye on purchases made outside Missouri to see if Missouri's use tax
might apply.
Fall Creek Construction Company, Inc. v. Director of Revenue demon-
strates that when planning for the purchase of property, parties should con-
sider the applicable use taxes to price the transaction accurately. Failing to
account for use taxes leaves open the risk that, following an audit, the cost of
the transaction will rise by the amount of unpaid use tax, accrued interest on
the unpaid use tax, and the costs of legal or accounting fees incurred in con-
nection with the audit. Many taxpayers try to plan around sales and use taxes
when making a purchase. While the incentive to plan around taxes increases
in proportion to the price of the underlying purchase, so too does the cost for
failing to appropriately consider all use tax consequences.
Fall Creek demonstrates that while it may be easy to plan around sales
taxes, it is much more difficult to avoid a use tax, especially when the tax-
payer enjoys the tax and regulatory advantages of ownership without also
incurring the burdens. This Note examines Missouri's use tax under a set of
particularly interesting and complex circumstances. In the instant case, a cor-
poration conducting business in several states owned a fractional interest in
transient personal property that was part of a much larger interchange agree-
ment. This case illustrates the breadth and effect of Missouri's use tax, raises
questions about how fractional ownership and interchange agreements may
affect the use tax analysis, and reflects the Missouri Supreme Court's unwill-
ingness to permit taxpayers to enjoy the advantages of ownership without
also bearing the burdens associated with those benefits.
1. 109 S.W.3d 165 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
2. R & M Enters., Inc., v. Dir. of Revenue, 748 S.W.2d 171, 171 (Mo. 1988)
(en banc), overruled on other grounds by House of Lloyd, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue,
884 S.W.2d 271 (Mo. 1994) (en banc).
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Fall Creek Construction Company ("Fall Creek") is a "real estate devel-
opment company with its principal place of business in Branson, Missouri."3
Fall Creek develops real estate in five states: Missouri, Mississippi, Arizona,
Virginia, and Tennessee. 4 Because Fall Creek employees regularly travel to
and from these locations, Fall Creek contacted Raytheon Travel Air Company
("Raytheon") on October 31, 1998, in order to purchase fractional interests in
two of Raytheon's aircraft to provide its employees air transportation.5 Ray-
theon is a Kansas corporation that "provides flying services under what is
generally called a fractional aircraft ownership program." 6 Under the pro-
gram, a participant purchases a percentage interest in a particular airplane
which, along with the execution of other agreements, contractually entitles
the participant to fly a certain number of hours in one of 110 aircraft in the
program.7 Fall Creek and Raytheon reached a deal where Fall Creek acquired
a 1/16th (6.25 percent) undivided interest in a King Air B200 aircraft, tail
number N713TA ("713TA") for $254,000 and a 1/8th (12.5 percent) undi-
vided interest in a Beech Jet 400A aircraft, tail number N798TA ("798TA")
for $772,500.8 "Delivery of [the aircraft] interests occurred in Wichita, Kan-
sas and neither Fall Creek nor Raytheon paid any sales or use tax to either
Kansas or Missouri." 9
Raytheon required that Fall Creek execute four separate agreements for
each aircraft, collectively referred to as the governing documents.' 0 The
documents consist of an aircraft purchase agreement, a joint ownership agree-
ment, a management agreement, and a master interchange agreement. 1" The
governing documents for each of the two aircraft are identical.1
2
The purchase agreements state that Fall Creek "desires to purchase...
an undivided property interest in the aircraft."'13 The purchase agreements
also provide that Fall Creek "must execute the governing documents and
must perform such actions as are required by the closing date; [may not]
place a lien on the aircraft; transfers [between Fall Creek] to third parties are
conditioned upon meeting strict requirements of Raytheon; Raytheon has
3. Fall Creek, 109 S.W.3d at 167.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Appellant's Brief at 5-6, Fall Creek (No. 84917).
7. Id.




12. Appellant's Brief at 6 n. 1, Fall Creek (No. 84917).
13. Fall Creek, 109 S.W.3d at 167.
[Vol. 70
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[the] right of first refusal;" and "Raytheon must purchase the interest back"
from Fall Creek after sixty months.
14
The joint ownership agreements provide that each fractional owner must
place the aircraft into the master interchange program and acknowledge that
each owner is a tenant in common with respect to the aircraft. 15 Further, each
owner waives any right to partition and agrees to divest itself of its interest in
the aircraft only in accordance with the governing documents.'
6
The management agreement provides that the co-owners must hire Ray-
theon to manage the aircraft and that each co-owner must "pay a separate
monthly management fee and a variable hourly rate for flight hours" to com-
pensate Raytheon for its management. 17 Under the management agreement,
Raytheon agrees to
manage[] aircraft scheduling and must make reasonable efforts to
obtain the owner's actual aircraft before providing a similar aircraft
under the interchange [agreement;] ... have the aircraft inspected,
maintained, serviced, repaired, overhauled, and tested; maintain all
required aircraft records and logs; provide pilots, pilot training, pi-
lot medical examinations and pilot uniforms. . . .hangaring, tie-
down space, in-flight catering, flight planning, weather services,
and communications;... maintain insurance on the aircraft; and...
provide consulting regarding FAA issues, warranty claims, and in-
surance matters.'
8
The master interchange agreement provides that each owner will "par-
ticipate in the master interchange program by sharing its aircraft with [the]
other participants in the program."' 19 Under the interchange agreement, if any
of the fractional owner's aircraft are unavailable, Raytheon will substitute
another similar aircraft from the 110 aircraft in the program.
20
Under the interchange program, the fractional owner informs Raytheon
of the date and destination of the trip and Raytheon then arranges for the air-
craft and pilot to fly the fractional owner to its destination. 21 "Raytheon...
determines whether the aircraft will fly ... due to adverse weather conditions
or other restrictions," but once the aircraft is in the air, the fractional owner is
in "operational control" of the aircraft and "may direct the pilot to an alter-
nate destination. '" 22
14. Id.
15. Id. at 167-68.
16. Id.
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One of the advantages to a fractional owner exercising "operational con-
trol" over the aircraft is the ability to operate within Part 9123 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations ("FARs") as a private aircraft operating under fewer
requirements and limitations than charter or airline aircraft. 24 With a few ex-
ceptions, in order for an aircraft to operate under Part 91 of the FARs, the
user must accept responsibility for "operational control, 25 of the aircraft,
whereby the fractional owner will be held responsible by the Federal Aviation
Administration ("FAA") and civil courts if there is an incident involving the
26
aircraft while under the owner's operational control. The FARs ensure that
owners are fully apprised of the consequences flowing from having opera-
tional control of the aircraft by requiring the aircraft owner to
acknowledge that he or she "(i) has responsibility for compliance
with all Federal Aviation Regulations applicable to the flight; (ii)
may be exposed to enforcement actions for noncompliance; and
(iii) may be exposed to significant liability risk in the event of a
flight-related occurrence that causes personal injury or property
damage."
27
The bill of sale and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records in-
dicate that Fall Creek is the legal owner of fractional interests in the aircraft.28
"[T]he bill of sale recites that Raytheon does ... hereby sell, grant, transfer
and deliver all rights, title, and interests in and to an undivided ... interest in
such aircraft unto: Fall Creek Construction Company, Inc."29 and "[t]he FAA
recognizes Fall Creek and the other co-owners as legal owners of a partial
23. Id. at 172. For purposes of the FAA,
aircraft are generally classified into three categories: private aircraft, char-
ter aircraft and airline aircraft. Private aircraft are typically operated under
Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), charter aircraft are
typically operated under Part 135 and airline aircraft are typically operated
under Part 121 .. .[the] primary concern is with the distinction between
Part 91 and Part 135. An aircraft owner would generally prefer to operate
under Part 91, since there are fewer requirements and limitations regard-
ing the operation of the aircraft. However, a Part 91 operator also cannot
transport others for compensation or hire.
Philip E. Crowther, Taxation of Fractional Programs: "Flying over Uncharted
Waters", 67 J. AIR L. & CoM. 241, 244 (2002).
24. Fall Creek, 109 S.W.3d at 172 (citing Crowther, supra note 23, at 249).
25. According to the FAA, "operational control" means that "the user exercises
full control over and bears full responsibility for the airworthiness and operation of
the aircraft." Crowther, supra note 23, at 244.
26. Fall Creek, 109 S.W.3d at 172 (citing Crowther, supra note 23, at 248).
27. Id. (quoting Crowther, supra note 23, at 248). See also 14 C.F.R. § 91.1013
(2004).
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interest in each . . . aircraft., 30 In addition, "Fall Creek depreciates the air-
craft[s] on its accounting ledgers." 3
1
The tax period under audit was October 30, 1998, through December 31,
1999.32 During this time, aircraft 713TA made 840 flights, twenty-six of
which were arrivals to or departures from Missouri; Fall Creek used the air-
craft in Missouri eight times, and the aircraft remained overnight in Missouri
thirteen times. 33 During the same period, aircraft 798TA completed 897
flights, sixteen of which were arrivals to or departures from Missouri; Fall
Creek used the aircraft in Missouri three times, and the aircraft remained
overnight in Missouri eleven times. 34 During the tax period, Fall Creek used
its fractional interest in Raytheon's fractional ownership program to make
sixty-seven flights to or from Missouri. 35 Fourteen of these flights were intra-
state.
36
After a sale and usage tax audit of Fall Creek, the Director of Revenue
"assessed unpaid use tax in the amount of $60,453.42 and accrued interest
totaling $8,120.67" for the purchase of interests in the two aircraft.37 Fall
Creek argued to the Director that it had traded in its interest in one of the
aircraft and should get a tax credit on the trade-in. The Director agreed and
the parties stipulated that if Fall Creek owed use tax, the amount to be as-
sessed was $49,928.79 plus accrued interest. 39
The Director of Revenue concluded that Fall Creek owed use tax on the
purchase of the interests in the two aircraft under Section 144.610 of the Mis-
souri Revised Statutes4° because the interests were tangible personal property
in another state, the transaction would have been subject to Missouri sales tax
if it occurred in Missouri, and Fall Creek exercised sufficient dominion and
30. Id.
31. Id.







39. Id. at 167.
40. Missouri Revised Statute Section 144.610.1 states:
A tax is imposed for the privilege of storing, using or consuming within
this state any article of tangible personal property purchased on or after
the effective date of sections 144.600 to 144.745 in an amount equivalent
to the percentage imposed on the sales price in the sales tax law in section
144.020. This tax does not apply with respect to the storage, use or con-
sumption of any article of tangible personal property purchased, produced
or manufactured outside this state until the transportation of the article has
finally come to rest within this state or until the article has become com-
mingled with the general mass of property of this state.
Mo. REV. STAT. §144.610.1 (2000).
2005]
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control over the property in Missouri to justify imposing the Missouri use tax
on the purchase.'"
Fall Creek filed a complaint with the Administrative Hearing Commis-
sion ("AHC") on April 13, 2001, contending that it did not owe use tax be-
cause its fractional ownership interest in the aircraft did not constitute owner-
ship of tangible personal property but rather the right to use the aircraft in the
interchange program for a specified number of hours per year.42 Fall Creek
further argued that even if its interest did qualify as tangible personal prop-
erty, Fall Creek did not owe the tax because there was an insufficient connec-
tion between the property and Missouri to justify the burden on interstate
commerce. 43 Fall Creek also argued that it did not exercise sufficient domin-
ion or control over the property to constitute "use" or "storage" under Section
144.6 10 and "that the aircraft did not 'finally come to rest' within Missouri as
required by Section 144.610. '"44
The AHC decided that Fall Creek was liable for the use tax on its frac-
tional ownership interests in the aircraft and upheld the Director's assess-
ment.45 Fall Creek appealed the decision to the Missouri Supreme Court un-
der Article V, Section Three of the Missouri Constitution.46 The Missouri
Supreme Court affirmed the AHC decision that Fall Creek was liable for the
use tax.47 The court held that (1) the fractional interests in the aircraft consti-
tuted tangible personal property; 48 (2) the use of the aircraft in Missouri,
however brief, was sufficient to create a substantial nexus justifying the bur-
den on interstate commerce;4 9 (3) "operational control" was sufficient to con-
stitute "use"; 50 and (4) the aircraft "finally came to rest in Missouri" when the
aircraft landed in Missouri and Fall Creek exercised "operational control"
over them.51 Fall Creek was therefore held liable for $43,369.63 in unpaid use
tax and $6,559.16 in accrued interest.52 Thus, the Missouri Supreme Court
41. Respondent's Brief at 9-11, Fall Creek (No. 84917).
42. Fall Creek, 109 S.W.3d at 169. See also Respondent's Brief at 6, Fall Creek
(No. 84917).
43. Fall Creek, 109 S.W.3d at 170-71.
44. Id. at 171-74.
45. Respondent's Brief at 6, Fall Creek (No. 84917).
46. Fall Creek, 109 S.W.3d at 168. The Missouri Supreme Court has jurisdiction
over cases involving the construction of a revenue law of the state. Mgmt. Servs., Inc.
v. Spradling, Inc., 547 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Mo. 1977) (en banc). See MO. CONST. art. V,
§3.
47. Fall Creek, 109 S.W.3d at 174.
48. Id. at 169-70. The court declined to look beyond the four comers of the con-
tract for extrinsic evidence of contractual intent because it found the language of the
contracts to be unambiguous. Id.
49. Id. at 170-71.
50. Id. at 172.
51. Id. at 173-74.
52. Id. at 174. See also id. at 168 n.3.
(Vol. 70
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held that transactions will be subject to Missouri use tax whenever they are
for the purchase of tangible personal property and the taxpayer exercises con-
trol or dominion over the property in Missouri for some period of time. 53 The
use tax attaches as soon as the property is ready to be used in Missouri.54
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A use tax is "a levy on the privilege of using within this state property
purchased outside Missouri, where the property would have been subject to
the sales tax if purchased locally." 55 The use tax complements, supplements,
and protects the sales tax.56 It "'eliminates the incentive to purchase from out-
of-state merchants in order to escape local sales taxes thereby keeping in-state
merchants competitive with sellers in other states, and it also provides a
means to augment state revenues."' 57 The United States Supreme Court has
rejected the basic principle that interstate commerce is immune from state and
local taxation and has held that "'interstate commerce may constitutionally be
made to pay its way."'8 While states have the right to tax interstate com-
merce, this right is not unfettered, and the Supreme Court has announced
limits to the right.59
When a taxpayer contests the assessment of use tax, there are two gen-
eral theories that the taxpayer may use. First, the taxpayer may argue through
general principles of statutory construction that under the taxpayer's particu-
lar circumstances, the statute authorizing the use tax does not apply. Second,
the taxpayer may argue that as the statute is applied, the use tax unconstitu-
tionally burdens interstate commerce. Fall Creek contested the Missouri use
tax under both theories.
Fall Creek argued that the use tax statute 60 did not apply to its purchase
of fractional interests in the aircraft for three reasons.6' First, the interests did
not constitute the purchase of tangible personal property but rather the right to
53. Id. at 169-72.
54. Id. at 173.
55. Id. at 169. See also Dir. of Revenue v. Superior Aircraft Leasing Co., Inc.,
734 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Mo. 1987) (en banc) (citing Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v.
Morris, 345 S.W.2d 62, 66 (Mo. 1961) (en banc)).
56. Fall Creek, 109 S.W.3d at 169. See also Superior Aircraft, 734 S.W.2d at
506 (citing Mgmt. Servs. v. Spradling, Inc., 547 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Mo. 1977) (en
banc)).
57. Fall Creek, 109 S.W.3d at 169 (quoting Superior Aircraft, 734 S.W.2d at
506).
58. Superior Aircraft, 734 S.W.2d at 506 (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451
U.S. 725, 754 (1981)).
59. See infra Part III.B.
60. Mo. REv. STAT. § 144.610 (2000).
61. Fall Creek, 109 S.W.3d at 169.
2005]
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use transportation services to which the use tax would not apply. 62 Fall Creek
also argued that even if the fractional interests did constitute the purchase of
tangible personal property, the Missouri use tax did not apply because Fall
Creek's use of the aircraft in Missouri did not, as a threshold matter, rise to
the level of "use" as intended by the statute.63 Finally, Fall Creek argued that
the statute did not apply because the aircraft never came to "finally rest" in
Missouri as required by the statute in order for the use tax to attach to the
purchases.
64
On constitutional grounds, Fall Creek argued that if the purchases of the
fractional interests in the aircraft were subject to Missouri use tax, imposition
of the tax would unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce because there
were insufficient contacts between the aircraft and the State of Missouri to
justify burdening interstate commerce.
65
A. Statutory Construction of Missouri Use Tax, Section 144.610
Missouri's use tax is set out in Section 144.610 of the Missouri Revised
Statutes, which states:
A tax is imposed for the privilege of storing, using or consuming
within this state any article of tangible personal property purchased
on or after the effective date of sections 144.600 to 144.745 in an
amount equivalent to the percentage imposed on the sales price in
the sales tax law in section 144.020. This tax does not apply with
respect to the storage, use or consumption of any article of tangible
personal property purchased, produced or manufactured outside
this state until the transportation of the article has finally come to
rest within this state or until the article has become commingled
with the general mass of property of this state.
66
The statute sets out four requirements that must be met in order for the
use tax to apply: (1) a purchase, for a particular price, (2) of tangible personal
property, (3) used, stored, or consumed in Missouri, (4) which has finally
come to rest within Missouri or become commingled with the general mass of
property in Missouri. The first requirement is almost always satisfied in use
tax cases. 67 Taxpayers very rarely contest use tax liability by claiming that
62. Id.
63. Id. at 171.
64. Id. at 172.
65. Id. at 170-71.
66. Mo. REv. STAT. § 144.610 (2000).
67. See Respondent's Brief at 9, Fall Creek (No. 84917) ("Obviously Fall Creek
made a purchase. It paid $1,026,500.").
[Vol. 70
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they did not purchase for a particular price. More often, taxpayers will chal-
lenge the second, third, and fourth requirements.
Under the second requirement, a court will determine whether the pur-
chase was of tangible personal property by considering the definitions set out
in Section 144.605, case law, and the contract(s) at issue. The statute defines
"tangible personal property" as "all items subject to the Missouri sales tax as
provided in subdivisions (1) and (3) of section 144.020, ' '68 which is then de-
fined as the "retail sale in this state of tangible personal property, including
but not limited to motor vehicles, trailers, motorcycles, mopeds, motor tricy-
cles, boats and outboard motors." 69 While the list does not include aircraft, it
is a non-excusive list and the Missouri Supreme Court has held that aircraft
are subject to Missouri sales tax.70
But even where the statutory language and case law make it clear that an
object is tangible personal property, a taxpayer may escape use tax liability
by showing that the parties' contractual intent was for the purchase of non-
taxable services or an intangible product and not for the purchase of the tan-
gible personal property itself. Under such an agreement, the parties would
intend to use the tangible personal property as merely the means to transmit
the intangible component. 71 It is well settled law in Missouri that when there
is no ambiguity in the language of the contract, "'the court need not resort to
construction of the contract, but rather the intent of the parties is determined
from the four comers of the contract."' 72 When the language of the contract is
ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be admitted to show contractual intent. 73
Such extrinsic evidence may include an analysis of the "essence of the trans-
action."
74
The "essence of the transaction" (sometimes also referred to as the "true
object" of the transaction) test has been recognized by the Missouri Supreme
Court as a way to determine whether to treat a transaction as a taxable trans-
fer of tangible personal property or the nontaxable performance of a service. 75
"The test focuses on the essentials of the transaction to determine the real
68. Mo REV. STAT. § 144.605(11).
69. Mo. REv. STAT. § 144.020.1(1) (2000 & Supp. 2003). Tangible personal
property also includes "sales of electricity or electrical current, water and gas, natural
or artificial, to domestic, commercial or industrial consumers." Id. § 144.020.1(3).
70. See Westwood Country Club v. Dir. of Revenue, 6 S.W.3d 885, 887 (Mo.
1999) (en banc).
71. Fall Creek Constr. Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 109 S.W.3d 165, 170 (Mo. 2003)
(en banc). See Eisenberg v. Redd, 38 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Mo. 2001) (en banc) (By
negative inference, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show the parties' contractual
intent when there is ambiguity in the language of the contract.).
72. Fall Creek, 109 S.W.3d at 170 (quoting Eisenberg, 38 S.W.3d at 411).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Sneary v. Dir. of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 342, 345 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
2005)
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object the buyer seeks" to purchase.76 Under the test, the Court has recog-
nized that in some transactions "tangible personal property serves exclusively
as the medium of transmission for an intangible product or service" and "[t]he
intangible component is the true object of the sale.""7 If a court determines
that the parties' intent was for the intangible object to be the true object of the
transaction, the "essence of the transaction" test is satisfied and the court will
not attach the taxable character of the tangible medium to the intangible ob-
ject.78
To determine if the third requirement is met, whether property was
"used," "stored," or "consumed" in Missouri, a court will again look to the
definitions in Section 144.605. Property is "stored" when it is kept or retained
in Missouri.79 It is "used" when the owner exercises "any right or power"
over the property or control of the property.80 Prior to Fall Creek, the extent
to which an owner would have to exercise dominion or control over property
for it to amount to "use" was not clear.
81
Under the fourth requirement, property must "finally come to rest"
within Missouri or "become commingled with the general mass of property"
in Missouri before a taxpayer is liable for use tax.82 Prior to Fall Creek, the
Missouri Supreme Court had never clearly articulated an interpretation of the
phrase "finally come to rest." In Director of Revenue v. Superior Aircraft
Leasing Co., 83 a case also contesting the assessment of use tax on the pur-
76. Id. (citing James v. TRES Computer Sys., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. 1982)




79. Mo. REv. STAT. § 144.605(10) (2000). "Storage" is defined as "any keeping
or retention in [Missouri] of tangible personal property purchased from a vendor,
except for property for sale or ... temporarily kept or retained in [Missouri] for sub-
sequent use outside [Missouri]." Id.
80. Id. § 144.605(13). "Use" is defined as "the exercise of any right or power
over tangible personal property incident to the ownership or control of that property,
[but] does not include the temporary storage of the property in [Missouri] for subse-
quent use outside [Missouri], or the sale of the property in the regular course of busi-
ness." Id.
81. Fall Creek argued that there was a threshold level of use required before an
owner had "used" property within Missouri sufficient to satisfy the use requirement.
Fall Creek Constr. Co v. Dir. of Revenue, 109 S.W.3d 165, 171-72 (Mo. 2003) (en
banc). However, the Director of Revenue argued that any use of the property in Mis-
souri would be sufficient to find "use" under the statute. Respondent's Brief at 11,
Fall Creek (No. 84917).
82. MO. REV. STAT. § 144.610.1 (2000).
83. 734 S.W.2d 504 (Mo. 1987) (en banc). Superior Aircraft has facts very simi-
lar to those in Fall Creek. Superior Aircraft is a Missouri corporation that purchased
an airplane in Kansas and then leased it to an Ohio company but was able through
provisions in the lease to use the airplane itself, and it used the airplane five times
[Vol. 70
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chase of an aircraft outside Missouri, the court did not expressly address the
phrase "finally come to rest" in its majority opinion, but the dissenting opin-
ion did. While the majority held that the taxpayer was liable for unpaid use
tax, the dissent argued that the taxpayer was not liable because the aircraft did
not "finally come to rest" within Missouri.8 4 The dissent stated that the air-
craft flew in and out of Missouri five times during the audit period and spent
a total of nineteen days in Missouri, which was insufficient to find that the
aircraft had "finally come to rest" within Missouri.85 Implicit in the majority's
opinion was the conclusion that Superior Aircraft's use of the aircraft in Mis-
souri was sufficient to find that the aircraft had "finally come to rest" within
Missouri, but the court did not articulate any explanation for why it reached
this conclusion. The court simply did not address what was necessary for an
item of personal property to "finally come to rest" within Missouri.
B. Constitutionality of the Use Tax on Interstate Commerce
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the
use tax's burden on interstate commerce, stating that "'interstate commerce
may constitutionally be made to pay its way."' 8 6 A use tax serves at least two
purposes. First, it complements, supplements, and protects the sales tax. 7
Second, it keeps in-state merchants competitive with out-of-state merchants
by eliminating the incentive to purchase from the out-of-state merchants in
order to escape local sales tax.88
While the Supreme Court has recognized that a state has the power to
tax the use of property purchased outside the state, this power is not unfet-
tered.89 The Court has articulated a four-prong test to determine whether a
state tax on interstate commerce complies with the Commerce Clause. This
test, known as the Complete Auto Transit test,90 provides that a state tax on
interstate commerce will not "be sustained unless the tax: (1) has a substantial
nexus with the State; (2) is fairly apportioned; (3) does not discriminate
during the audit's tax period to fly from Ohio, its principal place of business, to its
Missouri headquarters for board meetings. See id. at 505.
84. Id. at 508-09 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 508 n.1 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 506 (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 754 (1981)).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 506-07 (citing Maryland, 451 U.S. at 754).
90. The Complete Auto Transit Test is named after the case Complete Auto Tran-
sit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), in which the U.S. Supreme Court "'attempted
to clarify the apparently conflicting precedents it ha[d] spawned' in determining the
effect of the Commerce Clause on state taxation of interstate commerce." Superior
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against interstate commerce; and (4) is fairly related to the services provided
by the State." 91
1. Substantial Nexus
In Superior Aircraft, the Missouri Supreme Court applied the Complete
Auto Transit test to the Missouri use tax to determine whether it violated the
Commerce Clause when the Director of Revenue assessed use tax on an air-
plane purchased in Kansas by a Missouri corporation and no sales or use tax
was paid on the purchase in any state.92 The court upheld the assessment of
use tax, finding that the tax satisfied the four-prong test.
93
Under the first prong, the court found that there were sufficient contacts
between the aircraft and Missouri to create a substantial nexus.94 The court
found that it was not necessary for an airplane to be hangared or repaired in
the state in order for there to be a substantial nexus.95 The court held that a
substantial nexus was created when the airplane flew a sufficient number of
flights to or from Missouri and spent enough time in the state. 96 The court
stated that (i) the airplane made ten trips to or from Missouri from the date of
purchase through the audit period and that these flights represent 17.7 percent
of the flight hours logged, (ii) the airplane spent several days to approxi-
mately a week in Missouri for each trip, and (iii) nine of the ten trips to Mis-
souri were to attend board meetings that the court inferred were conducted in
accordance with Missouri law.97 The court found that all of these contacts
with Missouri were sufficient to establish a substantial nexus between the
state and the property to be taxed.98 The dissent did not find a substantial
nexus because it looked only to the contacts between the airplane and Mis-
souri during the audit period, which was eight months shorter than the time
period the majority examined, and based on those contacts found that the
airplane spent substantially fewer days in Missouri, made fewer flights, and
consequently did not establish a substantial nexus.99 The majority did not
explain why it chose to examine a time period longer than the audit period;
however, implicit in its holding is an interpretation by the Missouri Supreme
Court that the contacts to be examined under the substantial nexus test are
those starting from the date of purchase, regardless of the time period speci-
fied in the audit.
91. Superior Aircraft, 734 S.W.2d. at 507 (citing Maryland, 451 U.S. at 754).
92. Id. at 505.
93. Id. at 507-08.
94. Id. at 507.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 507 & n.3.
98. Id. at 507.
99. Id. at 508 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
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Under the second prong of the Complete Auto Transit test, a court must
find that the use tax is fairly apportioned. °° The United States Supreme Court
has stated that a use tax is fairly apportioned if there are no multi-state bur-
dens.!01 Multi-state burdens can be avoided by allowing either an offset or
credit for sales or use tax paid in another state, or through a system of appor-
tionment. 102 In Superior Aircraft, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the
use tax was fairly apportioned because Superior Aircraft had not paid sales or
use tax in any other state and because, even if it had, Missouri had a system
of tax credits for taxes paid in other states.' 0 3
3. Non-discrimination
Under the third prong of the test, the use tax cannot discriminate against
interstate commerce. 1 4 A use tax does not discriminate if the taxing state
places "no greater burden upon interstate commerce than it places upon com-
peting intrastate commerce of like character."' 1 5 As a compensatory tax, the
taxing "State must . . . 'identifty] the [intrastate tax] burden for which the
State is attempting to compensate."" 6 A use tax is a tax to protect, supple-
ment, and compensate sales tax.'0 7 Thus, the use tax must not burden inter-
state commerce any more than the sales tax burdens intrastate commerce. A
use tax will burden interstate commerce more than the sales tax burdens intra-
state commerce if the use tax exceeds the sales tax.' 0 8 Therefore, if the use tax
exceeds the sales tax, the use tax discriminates against interstate commerce in
favor of intrastate commerce.10 9
Additionally, a use tax discriminates if it applies to interstate businesses
but not intrastate businesses. In Superior Aircraft, the Missouri Supreme
Court held that Missouri's use tax does not discriminate among businesses
100. Id. at 507 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 754 (1981)).
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing Int'l Harvester Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340 (1944)).
103. Id. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 144.450 (2000).
104. Superior Aircraft, 734 S.W.2d at 507 (citing Maryland, 451 U.S. at 754).
105. Id. (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 282 (1987)).
106. Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 648 (1994) (quoting Or.
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 103 (1994)) (alteration in
original) (internal quotations omitted).
107. Farm & Home Sav. Ass'n v. Spradling, 538 S.W.2d 313, 317 (Mo. 1976).
108. Lohman, 511 U.S. at 648-49.
109. Id. at 649. An additional wrinkle to this evaluation may occur when there is a
difference among local sales taxes within a state. See id. at 654-56 (discussing how it
is possible that a use tax could be held unconstitutional in effect in one locality in the
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because any business, whether intrastate or interstate, that makes an out-of-
state purchase of tangible personal property to be stored, used, or consumed
in Missouri is liable for use tax."'
0
4. Fairly Related to the Services Provided by the State
Finally, a use tax must be fairly related to the services provided by the
taxing state in order to comply with the demands of the Commerce Clause."II
This inquiry requires looking at the facts of the case to see if the taxpayer did
use or could have used the services of the taxing state. For example, in Supe-
rior Aircraft, the court found that the use tax was fairly related to the services
provided by Missouri because Superior Aircraft flew the airplane to Missouri
in order to attend board meetings.' 2 The court inferred that these meetings
were conducted in accordance with Missouri law, and therefore "Superior
Aircraft could have used Missouri state courts to enforce resolutions arising
from such board meetings."" 3
IV. INSTANT DECISION
Fall Creek made four arguments as to why it should not be held liable
for use tax on the two aircraft. Three arguments were grounded in statutory
construction while the final argument was based on the constitutionality of
the use tax under the Commerce Clause. Fall Creek argued that it should not
be held liable for use tax on the aircraft because: (1) "its fractional ownership
interest in [the two] aircraft [did] not constitute a purchase of tangible per-
sonal property";' 14 (2) its use of the aircraft did not constitute "use";"5 (3) the
aircraft did not "finally come to rest";' 16 and (4) the use tax would be uncon-
stitutional under the Commerce Clause because there were insufficient con-
tacts between the aircraft and Missouri to establish a substantial 
nexus.17
110. Superior Aircraft, 734 S.W.2d at 507.
111. Id. (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 754 (1981)).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Fall Creek Constr. Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 109 S.W.3d 165, 169 (Mo. 2003)
(en banc).
115. Id. at 171.
116. Id. at 172.
117. Id. at 171.
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A. Statutory Construction of Missouri's Use Tax
1. Purchase of Tangible Personal Property
Fall Creek argued "that it [did] not owe use tax because its fractional
ownership interest in each aircraft [did] not constitute a purchase of tangible
personal property. ' 18 Instead, Fall Creek argued that the fractional ownership
interests were intended to be nontaxable purchases of transportation services
because the true object behind the transactions was to provide the owners
with "the right to use any aircraft in the interchange program for a specified
number of hours per year."' 19 The Director of Revenue countered that the
purchases were for more than transportation services, pointing to the lan-
guage of the purchase agreements and bills of sale, the FAA documents, Fall
Creek's depreciation of the two aircraft on its books, and Fall Creek's expo-
sure to the risk of a change in value in each aircraft.120 The Director argued
that these facts indicated that Fall Creek was the legal owner of partial inter-
ests in the physical aircraft. 121
Fall Creek argued that to determine the true object of the transaction, the
court should apply an "essence of the transaction" test.122 Under such an
analysis, Fall Creek's "ownership of the physical aircraft [was] merely inci-
dental and ... the true nature" and substance of the transactions were for the
purchase of transportation services.' 23 Fall Creek asserted that the governing
documents, which it was required to execute as a condition of the purchases,
placed so many conditions and restrictions on Fall Creek's right to use and
control each aircraft and its right to convey its interests in each aircraft that
what Fall Creek actually received in the transaction were transportation ser-
vices. 124
The Missouri Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Fall Creek pur-
chased tangible personal property when it purchased the fractional ownership
interests in each aircraft. 25 Underlying the court's holding is the suggestion
in dicta that "this was a complex transaction between sophisticated parties
designed to maximize regulatory and tax advantages," and that parties should
not be able to deliberately design their transactions to take advantage of tax
and regulatory benefits without also having to bear the tax burdens associated
with those benefits. 126 As the court pointed out, Fall Creek depreciated the
118. Id. at 169.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. Respondent's Brief at 9-11, Fall Creek (No. 84917).
121. Id. at 9-10.
122. Fall Creek, 109 S.W.3d at 170.
123. Id.
124. Appellant's Brief at 20-26, Fall Creek (No. 84917).
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aircraft in its accounting ledger and the FAA recognized Fall Creek and the
other co-owners as legal owners of partial interests, which permitted them to
operate the aircraft under Part 91 of the FARs with its more favorable regula-
tions than Part 135, which would control if the aircraft were operated as a
charter service.'
27
In holding that Fall Creek's fractional interests in the two aircraft consti-
tute a purchase of tangible personal property, the court first pointed out that
the purchase of an aircraft is subject to use tax. 128 The court stated that while
Section 144.605(7) does not expressly include aircraft in its definition of tan-
gible personal property, the definition's list is non-exclusive.1 29 The court
cited Westwood Country Club v. Director of Revenue,1 30 which held that an
aircraft is an item subject to Missouri sales tax and Missouri use tax.'
31
Second, the court declined to apply the "essence of the transaction" test
because it found the purchase agreement to be unambiguous. 32 The court
reasoned that the "essence of the transaction" test would constitute extrinsic
evidence of contractual intent, and therefore would only be admissible if the
contract contained ambiguity. 133 The court found that the purchase agreement
was unambiguous so it 'need not resort to construction of the contract, but
rather the intent of the parties is determined from the four comers of the con-
tract. "" 134 The court stated that "the mere fact that the purchase agreement
was executed along with other agreements [did] not render [it] ambigu-
ous."' 135 The court found the portion of the purchase agreement stating,
"Buyer desires to purchase from Seller, and Seller desires to sell to Buyer, the
undivided property interest ... in the aircraft," was sufficient to find that Fall
Creek intended to purchase property interests in each aircraft. 36 In dicta, the
court stated that even were it to look beyond the four comers of the purchase
agreement to the sixteen comers of the governing documents, it would still
have found that Fall Creek's intention was to purchase property interests in
the aircraft.1 37 The court pointed to the portion of the bill of sale stating that
Raytheon "does ... hereby sell, grant, transfer and deliver all rights, title, and
interests in ... such aircraft" to Fall Creek, and the portion of the separate
master interchange agreement stating that it is "an arrangement whereby a
127. Id. at 167, 172. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing the
regulatory advantages of operating under Part 91 as opposed to Part 135).
128. Id. at 169.
129. Id.
130. 6 S.W.3d 885 (Mo. 1999) (en banc).
131. Fall Creek, 109 S.W.3d at 169 (citing Westwood Country Club, 6 S.W.3d at
887). See supra Part III.A.
132. Fall Creek, 109 S.W.3d at 170.
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting Eisenberg v. Redd, 38 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Mo. 2001) (en banc)).
135. Id.
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person leases his airplane to another person in exchange for equal time, when
needed, on the other person's airplane" as evidence of the parties' intent to
transfer property rights in aircraft. 
138
2. What Constitutes "Use"
Fall Creek argued that even if the purchase of fractional ownership in-
terests in the two aircraft constituted a purchase of tangible personal property,
Fall Creek did not owe use tax because "it had insufficient dominion and
control over [the] aircraft to constitute 'storage' or 'use' under section
144.610."' 9 Fall Creek claimed that the only control it exercised over the
aircraft was de minimis control.140 The Director of Revenue replied that Fall
Creek exercised sufficient dominion and control over the aircraft because
"use" means the exercise of any right or power over the property.14 1
The Missouri Supreme Court held that Fall Creek was "simply incor-
rect" and that it did exercise sufficient dominion and control over the aircraft
to constitute "use."' 142 The court pointed out that one of the advantages of a
fractional ownership interest in an aircraft is that it permits the owner as user
to operate the aircraft within Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations.1
43
Under Part 91, the FAA requires the user to accept responsibility for "opera-
tional control" of the aircraft. 44 By accepting operational control, the user
can be "held responsible by the FAA and civil courts if there is an incident,"
which would include significant liability "in the event of a flight-related oc-
currence that causes personal injury or priority damage."' 145 The court found
that "[s]uch responsibility is more than token" and that the operational control
assumed by Fall Creek under Part 91 of the FARs "is a significant assumption
of control and responsibility ... clearly sufficient to constitute 'the exercise
of any right or power."1 46 Therefore, "Fall Creek used its aircraft [each time]
it boarded the aircraft and assumed operational control.' 47
3. What Constitutes "Finally Coming to Rest" in Missouri
Fall Creek also argued that it could not be held liable for use tax because
"the aircraft did not 'finally come to rest' within Missouri as required by Sec-
138. Id. (first alteration in original).
139. Id. at 171.
140. Id. at 172.
141. Respondent's Brief at 10, Fall Creek (No. 84917).
142. Id.
143. Id. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
144. Fall Creek, 109 S.W.3d at 172.
145. Id.
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tion 144.6 1O. ", 148 The statute states that "[tihe use tax does not apply 'until the
transportation of the article has finally come to rest within the state or until
the article has become commingled with the general mass of property of this
state.""149 Fall Creek argued that the aircraft were "purely transient" and
never came to rest in any location.150 The court disagreed, relying on Superior
Aircraft which applied the use tax to an airplane purchased outside Missouri
by a Missouri corporation despite the fact that Missouri was not the airplane's
permanent base or home.' 5' The court stated that it is the privilege of using
the property within Missouri, regardless of how brief in time this privilege
may be, that triggers the use tax.' 52 Therefore, the court held that "[t]he
phrase 'finally comes to rest' must necessarily be considered in relation to the
object to which it applies."' 53 The court stated that otherwise transient ob-
jects, such as aircraft and motor vehicles, would never "finally come to rest in
Missouri until [they] 'finally' entered the junkyard or scrap heap, for until
then such objects always have the capability of leaving the state."' 54 The
court further noted the property need not be "domiciled" in Missouri to be
taxed. 155 Rather, for the use tax to apply, the property must "finally" be ready
for "use" in Missouri, however brief the use might be.'
56
B. Constitutionality of the Use Tax on Interstate Commerce
Fall Creek argued that imposing Missouri's use tax on its fractional
ownership interest unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce.157 The
United States Supreme Court has held that a state has the right to tax the
privilege of using within the taxing state property purchased outside the tax-
ing state so long as the tax meets the four prongs of the Complete Auto Tran-
sit test.158 Under the test, the Missouri use tax must: (1) have a substantial
nexus with Missouri; (2) be fairly apportioned; (3) not discriminate against
interstate commerce; and (4) be fairly related to the services provided by Mis-
souri.
148. Id.
149. Id. (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 144.610.1 (2000)).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 173 (citing Dir. of Revenue v. Superior Aircraft Leasing Co., 734






157. Id. at 170.
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Fall Creek argued that the use tax failed to satisfy the first, second, and
fourth prongs of the Complete Auto Transit test.' However, in its points
relied on, Fall Creek alleged a lack of substantial nexus but failed to allege
that the tax was not fairly apportioned or fairly related to the services pro-
vided by Missouri. Therefore, the only constitutional issue Fall Creek pre-
served was the substantial nexus issue.
1 62
Fall Creek conceded that Superior Aircraft is the controlling law on the
substantial nexus issue, but argued that, unlike the airplane in Superior Air-
craft, Fall Creek's two aircraft did not have a sufficient number of contacts
with Missouri to create a substantial nexus. 63 Fall Creek pointed out that in
Superior Aircraft, 17.7 percent of the taxpayer's airplane's flight hours were
spent flying the airplane in or out of Missouri.164 Fall Creek argued that when
the court analyzed Fall Creek's use of the aircraft in Missouri to determine if
there was a substantial nexus, the court must look at Fall Creek's use of the
particular aircraft in which it owned fractional interests to determine whether
there were sufficient contacts with Missouri to create a substantial nexus.
65
Fall Creek pointed out that the 713TA aircraft, in which it owned a 6.25 per-
cent interest, made 840 flights during the audit period, twenty-six of which
were either to or from Missouri, but only eight of these flights were made by
Fall Creek, representing .9 percent of the flights made by the aircraft during
the audit period.' 66 The 798TA aircraft, in which Fall Creek owned a 12.5
percent interest, made 897 flights during the audit period, of which sixteen
were either to or from Missouri, but only three of which were made by Fall
Creek, representing only .3 percent of the flights made by the aircraft during
the audit period.' 67 Fall Creek also pointed out that it made no intrastate
flights in either aircraft.
168
The Missouri Supreme Court held that there was a sufficient nexus by
analyzing the contacts between each aircraft and Missouri irrespective of who
was operating the aircraft when they made these contacts.1 69 The Court stated
that "[t]here exists the requisite nexus with Missouri" to impose the tax be-
cause "[t]hese aircraft departed from or arrived in Missouri forty-two times
and remained overnight in Missouri twenty-four times during the tax period"
160. Id. at 171 n.5.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Appellant's Brief at 38-41, Fall Creek (No. 84917).
164. Id. at 39.
165. Id. at 39-40.
166. Id. at 40.
167. Id. at 41.
168. Id.
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and this "'use in Missouri, however brief, is a taxable incident' sufficient
to create a substantial nexus.
" 70
Even though Fall Creek failed to preserve its arguments that the use tax
was not fairly apportioned and did not fairly relate to the services provided by
Missouri, the Missouri Supreme Court addressed these arguments in dicta.
171
The court stated that the use tax is fairly apportioned because Missouri pro-
vides a credit for sales or use taxes paid in another state.172 The court also
stated that the use tax is fairly related to the services provided by Missouri
because Fall Creek "used these aircraft for its business and 'could have used
Missouri state courts to enforce' the resulting business transactions ... and
[it] 'enjoys the benefits and protection of [Missouri's] public services."' 173
V. COMMENT
Although the point was only made in dicta, the underlying message in
Fall Creek is that Missouri will not permit parties to structure transactions to
take advantage of the tax and regulatory advantages of ownership without
also incurring the burden. In the court's recitation of the facts, it made only
fleeting note of the fact that Fall Creek depreciated its interests in the two
aircraft in its accounting ledgers. 174 While the court does not say that Fall
Creek depreciated the interests for tax purposes, one can only assume that if
Fall Creek was deprecating the aircraft on its accounting books then it was
also depreciating them for tax purposes. The court also noted the advantages
Fall Creek gained from operating the aircraft under Part 91 of the FARs as
private aircraft rather than as a charter service under Part 135.175 The court
did not expressly hold that Fall Creek owed use tax because it was incurring
the benefits of ownership, but the court did recognize that "this was a com-
plex transaction between sophisticated parties designed to maximize regula-
tory and tax advantages."'' 76 The instant case strongly suggests that taxpayers
should not be allowed to have their cake and eat it too by designing transac-
tions to take advantage of the tax and regulatory benefits of ownership with-
out also having to bear the tax burdens associated with those benefits.
In Fall Creek, for the first time, a majority of the court expressly ad-
dressed and interpreted the phrase "finally comes to rest" under Section
170. Id. (quoting R&M Enters., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 748 S.W.2d 171, 173
(Mo. 1988) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by House of Lloyd, Inc. v. Dir. of
Revenue, 884 S.W.2d 271 (Mo. 1994) (en banc)).
171. Id. at 171 n.5.
172. Id. (citing Dir. of Revenue v. Superior Aircraft Leasing Co., 734 S.W.2d 504,
507 (Mo. 1987) (en banc)). See Mo. REV. STAT. § 144.450 (2000).
173. Fall Creek, 109 S.W.3d at 171 n. 5 (quoting Superior Aircraft, 734 S.W.2d at
507; R & MEnter., 748 S.W.2d at 173).
174. Id. at 167.
175. Id. at 172.
176. Id. at 170.
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144.610 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. Prior to Fall Creek, it was unclear
what was necessary for property to "finally come to rest" within Missouri.
Fall Creek held that property "finally comes to rest" in Missouri when the
property is "finally" ready for "use" in Missouri, however brief the use might
be. 177 The court stated that the phrase "must necessarily be considered in rela-
tion to the object to which it applies" because to do otherwise would permit
transient property to evade the use tax until the property loses its capability of
leaving the state. 
178
In Fall Creek, the court applied the four-prong Complete Auto Transit
test to determine the constitutionality of the Missouri use tax, but the court
erred in its analysis under the first prong of the test. In its analysis, the court
ignored the unique problems present when property is co-owned and part of
an interchange agreement. When determining whether there was a substantial
nexus between Fall Creek's ownership interests in the aircraft and the State of
Missouri, the court looked at the contacts between the aircraft in which Fall
Creek owned fractional interests and the total contacts these aircraft had with
Missouri irrespective of the identity of the user. 179 Therefore, it did not matter
who was operating the aircraft when it made the contacts with Missouri. The
court counted not only the number of times Fall Creek used the aircrafts to fly
to or from Missouri, but it also counted the number of times any participant in
the interchange agreement used the aircraft to fly into or out of Missouri.
Furthermore, the court disregarded those flights Fall Creek made to or from
Missouri on any one of the 108 aircraft in the interchange agreement in which
Fall Creek did not own a fractional interest. While a more appropriate analy-
sis in this case may not have resulted in a different outcome, this method of
analysis is clearly not good precedent.
The court's analysis should reflect whether Fall Creek's use, irrespective
of the other co-owners' use, created sufficient contacts with Missouri to es-
tablish a substantial nexus between Fall Creek's fractional interests and Mis-
souri. Instead, the court's analysis treated Fall Creek as owning the entire
interest or having operated the aircraft during all of the aircraft's contacts
with Missouri. When the use tax is applied to a fractional interest, it would be
more appropriate to ignore the use made by other co-owners and analyze only
those contacts made between the property and the taxing state when the co-
owner in question was "using" the property and compare these contacts to the
taxpayer's total use of the property.
The court also ignored the unique problems an interchange agreement
presents in the substantial nexus test. Perhaps, in the presence of an inter-
change agreement, a court should look at not only the taxpayer's use of the
property it owns but also the taxpayer's use of property in the interchange
program that the taxpayer does not own. A court would then compare the
177. Id. at 173.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 171.
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taxpayer's use of any property that is part of the interchange agreement in the
taxing state and compare it to the taxpayer's total use of the interchange pro-
gram.
It is not clear why the Fall Creek court did not tailor its analysis under
the substantial nexus test to address the unique effects of co-ownership and
interchange agreements. Perhaps it was an oversight on the court's part or
perhaps the court consciously did not address these issues to avoid undercut-
ting its decision that fractional interests of personal property in an interchange
program represent the purchase of tangible personal property as opposed to
the nontaxable right to transportation services. Regardless of its reasons, the
court's analysis under the substantial nexus test is flawed and could distort
the outcome of future cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Fall Creek examines the applicability of the Missouri use tax when a
corporation conducting business in several states owns a fractional interest in
transient personal property that is part of a larger interchange agreement. In
Fall Creek, the Missouri Supreme Court held that (1) fractional interests in
aircraft that are part of a larger interchange agreement constitute tangible
personal property; 180 (2) the use of taxable property in Missouri, however
brief, is sufficient to create a substantial nexus in order to justify burdening
interstate commerce;' 81 (3) "operational control" is sufficient to constitute
"use" when it represents a significant assumption of control and responsibil-
ity;182 and (4) property has "finally come to rest" in Missouri when it is "fi-
nally" ready for "use" in Missouri, however brief this use might be.' 
83
Fall Creek illustrates the breadth and effect of the Missouri use tax. It
raises questions about how fractional ownership and interchange agreements
may affect the analysis. And most importantly, Fall Creek reflects the Mis-
souri Supreme Court's unwillingness to permit taxpayers to enjoy the advan-
tages of ownership without also bearing the burdens associated with those
benefits.
JENNIFER A. SIMMONS
180. Id. at 169-70.
181. Id. at 171.
182. Id. at 172.
183. Id. at 173.
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